Plato’s Meno is most famous for the interlude in which Socrates questions Meno’s slave about geometry in order to show that knowledge is not taught but recollected. Specifically, Socrates argues that “[a]s the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are as a whole, recollection” (Plato 880).

The reason for Socrates’ conclusion is that he learns from the priests and the priestesses that human soul is immortal; therefore, the soul must have “seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned” (880). Consequently, “it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things” (880). Socrates goes on to question the slave in order to prove in practice that knowledge is indeed recollected rather than taught. As such, Socrates shows that Meno’s “debater’s argument” that one “cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for” is in fact unsound, and that believing it will make people “idle” and “fainthearted” (880).

Questions can be raised in terms of both Socrates’ conclusion and his practical proof by questioning the slave. First of all, it is very possible that the slave does not arrive at his own conclusions; instead, Socrates, by questioning him, almost gives him the right answers so that the slave is actually told what to do rather than recollecting by himself. At this point, one might draw an analogy with one of the major objections to the Turing Test which says that the computer is not self-conscious of what it is doing because it is merely programmed and told what to do by human beings. Similarly, Socrates’ “experiment” does not prove that the slave (computer) by himself arrives at any conclusion and recollects any knowledge.

Secondly, Socrates’ conclusion that knowledge is recollected fails to explain both the origin of knowledge and the background of knowing. Even if knowledge is in fact recollected, people still need to somehow acquire it in the first place; otherwise, there will be nothing to recollect. Thus, Socrates does not seem to explain how people are able to recollect before knowing anything in the first place. To take this idea one step further, one might argue that there is a background of knowing in people’s consciousness, on the basis of which we form new knowledge. For example, in order to know geometry, one has to know numbers, lines, and so forth to begin with. Therefore, when Socrates says to the slave, “work it out and tell me” (882), does he simply assume that the slave already knows what it takes to “work it out,” or does he believe that such background-knowledge is also recollected? Moreover, even if the slave does indeed come to his own conclusion, and even if the background-knowledge is also recollected, it still does not follow that the slave recollects the knowledge of geometry that he does not know a moment ago. The reason is that the background of knowing lies between new knowledge and potential memories so that new knowledge is not directly recollected from potential memories but indirectly formed or learnt on the basis of the background of knowing.

Finally, one might also wonder if all kinds of knowledge can be recollected. It might be argued that only eternal knowledge, or Forms, can be recollected since they are perfect in themselves and do not change. In terms of others, recollection probably does not work since they constantly change under different circumstances.

Works Cited

Plato. Complete Works, ed. John Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company. 1997.