Toward the end of his discussion of the mater-slave dialectic, Hegel argues that “[i]f consciousness fashions the thing without the initial absolute fear, it is only an empty self-centred attitude; for its form or negativity is not negativity per se, and therefore its formative activity cannot give it a consciousness of itself as essential being” (Hegel 119). Therefore, although the truth of the master is in reality the unessential consciousness, the presence of the master and the fear he imposes upon the slave are nonetheless necessary for the slave to eventually and dialectically overcome his slavery and become the essential consciousness. From this perspective, if one is to replace the two individual self-consciousnesses in Hegel’s account with two individual nations, the life and death struggle and the master-slave dialectic can thus be interpreted as those between two nations in a global context. Following this line of thought, one might argue that Hegel’s emphasis on the necessity of both the presence of the master and his imposition of fear on the slave can be interpreted as a potential justification for imperialism and colonialism. Walt Whitman Rostow, who in reality is an advocate in justifying European imperialism and colonialism in economic development, argues similarly in his famous book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto that poor countries need to be awakened by foreign, particularly European, intrusions in order to get back to the right track of development. From my perspective, there are obvious similarities between Hegel’s phenomenological argument of the master at the outset of the master-slave dialectic and Rostow’s cultural, economical, and political argument of the strong European country at the beginning stages of economic development. Consequently, it is entirely plausible to interpret Hegel’s argument as a potential justification for imperialism and colonialism at certain stages of development. Nevertheless, one should not go so far as to claim that Hegel’s Eurocentric ideology necessarily leads to a Eurocentric and Rostovian conclusion that imperialism and colonialism as a whole are fully justified, because there are also obvious disagreements between Hegel’s and Rostow’s arguments.

According to Hegel, the life and death struggle between two self-consciousnesses gives birth to both the initial dichotomy between the master and the slave as well as the master-slave dialectic that follows. As Hegel points out, the recognition between the master and the slave is one-sided. From the perspective of the master, he is recognized by someone whom he does not recognize because the slave is mere thingness. Therefore, this one-sided recognition puts the mater in an existential impasse that restricts his ability of transcending himself, which consequently makes the self-consciousness of the master unessential. From the perspective of the slave, however, the master is the essential reality in the sense that the master is autonomous and free. Moreover, serving the master requires the slave to repress his own desires in order to fulfill the desires of the master. Finally, the fear internalizes in the slave and gives him a self-negativity motivating him to overcome this fear by working, or in other words, by shaping himself through producing tangible products in nature. Therefore, with the combination of fear, service, and work, the slave dialectically overcomes his slavery and becomes the essential consciousness. However, as Alexandre Kojève has pointed out, “there is no Slave without a Master. The Master, then, is the catalyst of the historical, anthropogenetic process. He himself does not participate actively in this process; but without him, without his presence, this process would not be possible” (Kojève 25). In other words, the master is both unessential and essential at the same time: he is unessential in himself because of his existential impasse, yet the master is essential for the slave to realize the latter’s potentiality.

Different from Hegel’s phenomenological perspective, Rostow takes on a cultural, economical, and political perspective to study the struggle among individual countries in the world. Rostow specializes in British economic history and applies it to the rest of the world. In The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, he divides the long march to modernity into five stages, of which the early stages are of most interest. According to Rostow, the first stage of economic growth is “the traditional society,” during which society is characterized by fatalism. People believe that their lives will be the same as those of their ancestors, and the Western concept of progress is still unknown. As a result, almost everyone is poor at this stage, and the economy is stagnant. This cultural, economical, and political impasse is finally disturbed by foreign, and in Rostow’s case, European, intrusions in the second stage, “preconditions for take-off.” In Rostow’s view, a foreign intrusion can shock traditional societies out of their cultural torpor, political ineffectiveness, and economic stagnation. Therefore, although the intrusion might be violent and exploitative, its effects on traditional societies are far-reaching and, on balance, beneficial, because it gives birth to the belief of progress and nationalism that are absolutely crucial in the early stages of economic development. At this point, Rostow particularly has Japan in mind, because for Rostow the subsequent development of Japan owes a great deal to the initial “shock” when Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his infamous four black ships showed up at the harbor of Edo Bay on July 8, 1853. Once the preconditions have been established, there will emerge one or more leading economic sectors that can lift the rate of capital accumulation up to a self-sustaining level; hence, a society has reached the third stage, “the take-off.” Eventually, the economy will experience the fourth stage, “the drive to maturity,” and the fifth as well as the last stage, “the age of high mass consumption,” both of which are beyond the scope of this essay (Rostow).

From the brief summaries of both Hegel’s phenomenological argument and Rostow’s economical argument above, one could easily identify one obvious similarity between the two, that is, the necessary presence of the master or the master-like country, at certain stages of the development of the slave’s self-consciousness or the economy of the poor country. Although it is more than plausible for Hegel to argue for imperialism and colonialism according to his inevitably Eurocentric ideology, one should caution to draw too radical a conclusion at this point, because there are obviously significant differences between Hegel’s and Rostow’s arguments.

First of all, while Hegel’s two individual self-consciousnesses start off equally before the life and death struggle, Rostow does not assume equality among all countries before the intrusion takes place. In Hegel’s account, before the life and death struggle, there is no distinction between the master and the slave; instead, there are only individual and somewhat identical self-consciousnesses. Therefore, it is because of the struggle that the master-slave dichotomy appears. However, for Rostow, there seems to be a presupposed dichotomy between the strong European country and the rest of the world even before the intrusion, which begs for the question of how the strong European country is able to take off to maturity without the seemingly necessary shock in their early stages of development. On the one hand, if the strong European country is able to reach their taking-off point without any foreign intrusion and exploitation, then it contradicts one of the major premises of Rostow’s argument, that is, all countries essentially go through the same stages of development. On the other hand, if Rostow implies that European countries are somehow more superior to the rest of the world and do not have to experience foreign shocks in order to develop, then his argument simply begs the question because what he is essentially arguing is that European countries are superior because they are superior. From my perspective, this difference suggests that Hegel does not necessarily take on any particular stance at this early stage; instead, he is more of an outsider dialectically looking in. Rostow, who presupposes the superiority of the strong European country, thus necessarily takes on the stance of European imperialism and colonialism, which seems to have ironically weakened his argument.

Another major difference between the two arguments is concerned with the eventual results of the dialectical struggle and the foreign intrusion. For Hegel, the slave eventually and dialectically overcomes his slavery and becomes the power behind the progression of history. For Rostow, however, poor countries at most will be able to catch up with strong European countries, although the chances, from a modern perspective, seem to be very slim. Therefore, this difference suggests that in the aftermath Hegel is on the side of the slave while Rostow is still on the side of European imperialism and colonialism. It thus follows that although Hegel, with his references to the master, might imply some justification for imperialism and colonialism at the outset of the dialectic, he nevertheless does not offer justification for imperialism and colonialism as a whole as Rostow seems to have done.

In conclusion, during Hegel’s discussion of the master-slave dialectic, he emphasizes the necessary presence of the master for the slave to realize his essential consciousness. Although this claim seems to offer some justification for imperialism and colonialism at certain stages of development, it does not justify them as a whole as Rostow attempts to. On the contrary, Hegel has made himself clear that he is on the side of the slave, and that he believes that the slave is the underlying force for the progression of human history.

Works Cited

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Tr. A.V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1977.

Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Cornell University Press, 1980.

Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge University Press, 1960.