In Chapter Seven of Book Ten, Aristotle examines the contemplative life and concludes that a life “concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation” (Aristotle 288) is the happiest life. He goes on to give several reasons to support his conclusion.

First of all, since happiness “is activity in conformity with virtue” (288), then the greatest happiness should conform to the highest virtue. As Aristotle points out, “intelligence is the highest possession we have in us” (289), it naturally follows that intellectual activity, or contemplation, is the greatest happiness. Secondly, although most human activities are not continuous, contemplation seems to be an exception: “we are able to study continuously more easily than to perform any kind of action” (289). Thirdly, because the pleasure “proper to a morally good activity is good” (284), and contemplative activities are not only good in themselves but also the most pleasant, it must follow that a contemplative life is of the greatest good and thereby the happiest. Fourthly, Aristotle also points out that contemplation is the most self-sufficient activity. Finally, since “we regard happiness as depending on leisure” (289), it follows that contemplation, which requires much more leisure than political and military activities, leads to the greatest happiness.

After explaining his position, Aristotle goes on to argue that “such a life would be more than human” because “intelligence is divine in comparison with man . . . [and] a life guided by intelligence is divine in comparison with human life” (290). That is to say, the greatest happiness is the happiness of the gods, and this claim leads to several questions.

First of all, the entire Nichomachean Ethics is concerned with terrestrial happiness, that is, what happiness means for us human beings and how we can eventually obtain it. Therefore, it seems rather peculiar that Aristotle introduces this celestial and greater happiness in the very end of the treatise. One might argue that Aristotle is setting up a target beyond human capacity that attempts to reach it would foster human beings to become happier. Perhaps a similar example would be the case of Jesus Christ as the perfect human being whom every Christian should strive to become yet understands that it is impossible to actually do so in the secular world. However, following Christ’s teachings and attempting to become who he is will help believers with their self-perfection. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not explicitly explain his intention of adding this higher level of happiness, which makes his argument somewhat confusing.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s description of and attitude toward the gods are inconsistent throughout Nichomachean Ethics. In the early part of the treatise, Aristotle seems to regard the gods as chance and thinks that they are totally separated from the human sphere. However, in later part of the treatise, especially in Book Ten, Aristotle not only “assume[s] that the gods are in the highest degree blessed and happy” (292), but also explicitly claims that “the gods have . . . concern[s] for human affairs” (294). The oscillation among his different descriptions and attitudes toward the gods is perhaps the source for Aristotle’s sudden change of opinion toward happiness in Book Ten. What I have noticed is that Aristotle almost always uses indefinite words and phrases, such as “assume” and “seem,” to describe the gods. Therefore, what Aristotle might be trying to convey is that if gods are really what he thinks they are, then there lies a greater happiness, i.e. the contemplative life. Then is it possible that Aristotle is proposing something more hypothetical than conclusive in terms of happiness in Book Ten? Unfortunately, Aristotle seems to have left this question unanswered too.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Ostwald. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1999.